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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Accepting evidence from many sources that policing is 
undergoing an historic restructuring, we attempt to describe the 
forms that this is taking, the reasons for it, and the issues that 
it raises for governance, especially with respect to the issues of 
justice, equity, and quality of service. We believe that the 
current restructuring is worldwide, although our information is 
drawn more extensively from democratic countries, both developed 
and developing. The report does not undertake original research, 
but explores how the topic should be studied. It concludes with a 
lisFing of the topics that most urgently need to be studied if 
contemporary developments in policing are to be understood and 
made responsible to public policy. 
(1)  Policing is being reconstructed worldwide. Its distinguishing 
features are  (a)  the separation of those who authorize policing 
from those who do it and  (b)  the transference of both functions 
away from government. 
(2)  The change in policing cannot be understood in customary 
terms. It is often miss-characterized, for example, as 
“privatization.” Because the distinction between public and 
private domains becomes problematic in the new policing, we 
suggest that the more appropriate description for what is 
occurring is “multilateralization  .I’ 
(3)  In order to understand what is happening to policing, it is 
essential to distinguish between the way in which policing is 
authorized from the way in which it is providers. In other words, 
the instigators of policing may differ from the providers of it. 
(4)  Policing is being authorized currently by five sets of 
auspices -  economic interests, both legal and illegal; residential 
communities; cultural communities; individuals; and governments. 
(5)  Policing is being provided by commercial companies, non- 
governmental authorizers of policing, individuals, and 
governments. 
(6)  Many non-governmental providers now perform the same tasks as 
the public police. 
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(7)  Although public and private providers perform the same tasks, 
they employ distinctive practices. Specifically, governmental 
providers tend to prevent crime through punishing; non- 
governmental providers through exclusion and the regulation of 
access. 
e 
(8)  In response to  ,the  restructuring of policing, the role of the 
public police may be changing significantly. In particular, its 
agenda is becoming increasingly that of government rather than of 
individuals; it is specializing in criminal investigation and 
and it is increasingly militarized in equipment and outlook. 
undercover surveillance; its opera'tions  are undertaken in groups;  ,I 
(9)  The explanations for the current restructuring of policing  , 
involve the shortcomings of the public police, increases in crime, 
nature of economic systems, character of government, social 
structure, ideas, and culture. The most popular explanations fall 
under the first three categories. 
(10)  These explanations are largely hypotheses. Very l'ittle 
empirical research has been done to test confirm them. 
(11)  In the current restructuring of policing, it is important for 
governments to continue to safeguard justice',  equity, and quality 
of service. 
(12)  In order to safeguard the public interest in policing, 
governments must develop the capacity to regulate, audit, and 
facilitate the restructuring of policing. 
(13)  Research on the structure of policing has been fragmentary 
and uneven. Study needs to be undertaken into the extent and 
character the changes, their impact on society, the role and 
responsibilities of government, and the causes of the changes. 
(14)  Policing is being restructured through the development of new 
auspices and providers within states and by the transference of 
police functions to transnational and international agencies. In 
other words, policing is being challenged by forces inside and 
outside contemporary nation-states. 
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Policing is being transformed and restructured in the modern 
world. This involves much more than reforming the institution we 
regard as the police, although that is occurring as weJ1. The key 
to the transformation is that.policing,  meaning the activity of 
making societies safe, is no longer being carried out exclusively 
by g,overnments.  Indeed, it is an open question whether governments 
are even the primary providers. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, 
policing has been multilateralized. Today a host of non- 
governmental groups have assumed responsibility for their own 
protection and a host of non-governmental agencies have undertaken 
to provide security services. Policing has entered a new era, an 
era characterized by a transformation in the governance of 
I 
security. 
Although a number of studies have attempted to document in 
particular countries the rise of what is loosely referred to as 
private security, we believe that the extent of the transformation 
of policing has yet to be determined  (Johnston 1999, Johnston 
1994; Johnston 1992; De Waard 1999, Shearing and Stenning 1981; 
Nalla and Newman 1991; Cunningham et al., 1985; Stenning and 
Shearing 1980). We believe, however, that the following statements 
about the current restructuring are true, and amply justify our 
effclrt to understand what is happening:  a 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.'(1)  In most countries, certainly in the democratic world, 
private police outnumber public police. 
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daily lives in plac,es  where visible crime-prevention and control 
is provided by non-government rather than by government police 
agencies. 
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(3)  The reconstruction of policing is occurring worldwide 
despite differences in wealth and economic systems. 
Viewed historically, what is happening to policing is not 
unprecedented. It could be argued that the monopolization of 
policing by government is an aberration. It is only in the last 
one to two hundred years that policing has been effectively 
monopolized by government, and even that was'  uneven across 
countries  (Spitzer  and Scull 1977; Shearing and Stenning 1981; 
Blair 1998). In Europe, for example, France led the way in the 
systematic nationalization of policing in the 17th century  (Bayley 
1975). Nationalization followed fitfully throughout the rest of 
continental Europe, concentrated largely in towns and often 
deferring to the private authority of the landowning aristocracy. 
Prussia permitted the Junker aristocracy to police their large 
estates up to the unification of Germany in 1871. Russia, too, 
allowed policing to be shared between government and the landed 
gentry until the early 20th century. In England policing remained 
largely in private hands until well into the 19th century. In the  0 
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cities in the middle of the 19th, private policing never really  a 
died  (Walker 1977; Monkennon 1981). The constituent states didn't 
begin to develop organized police forces until the early 20th 
century and the national government not until a decade or so later 
(Smith  1925). 
Is the current resructuring of policing, then, simply a 
return to the past, another cycle in the historical ebb and flow 
of policing power between governmental and non-governmental 
agency? Yes and no. Clearly governments have shared, even 
conceded, the power to police to non-governmental groups before 
(Bayley  1985). Sometimes security has been so precarious that 
government could scarcely be said to exist at all in  many parts of  ' 
the world. At the same time, the restructuring that is taking 
place today, we believe, is taking a different form than in the 
past because contemporary societies are organized differently than 
previous ones. Indeed, we believe that the concepts and 
terminology inherited from the past are inadequate for 
understanding what is happening today. In order for policy-makers 
to comprehend, and possibly deal effectively, with the current 
transformation in policing, it will be necessary to examine 
contemporary developments with a fresh intellectual eye. 
Our knowledge of what is occurring is based largely on 
0  studies from democratic countries. These, after all, are where 
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character of government, then, affects what is known about 
policing and, as we shall discuss, probably the extent of 
restructuring as weill. Although we believe the restructuring to be 
, 
, 
worldwide, it remains for new research to document the extent of 
t 
it across the globe. We do know that the'change  in policing is  t, 
occurring across the divide of economic development, with 
developing democracies participating along with developed ones. 
When we talk about "policing" in this report we are not 
referring to all the means by which human beings provide'safety 
for themselves. "Policing" for us is not synonymous with ''social 
Everyone plays a role in these processes -  parents, siblings, 
peers, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, and a host of authority 
figures. This report will not reinvent social control theory.'Our 
focus is on intentional attempts to regulate the distribution of 
physical security produced by actual or potential use of force.' We 
are dealing, then, with the governance of security in the modern 
world. We emphasize physical security because that is what people 
want foremost from police, notwithstanding the fact that 
I  People familiar with writing about the police will recognize that this is not a complete definition of the police. It is an 
approximation, indicating what people commonly expect of the police. For a discussion of the concept of "police" and 
one attempt at a definition that can be applied comparatively both historically and geographically, see Bayley's Patterns 
of Policing (1  985). 
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technology has produced new forms of insecurity in relation to  a 
information, non-real property, and cyber processes. 
The purpose of this report is threefold: 
(1)  To review systematically what is known about the 
contemporary restructuring of policing. 
(2)  To reflect about the meaning and significance of what is 
occurring in order to develop concepts and terminology that do  , 
justice to the phenomenon. 
(3)  To specify a prioritized research agenda for 
understanding the restructuring of policing and for supporting the 
development of policy to deal with it. 
This reDort is derivative, based on what others have found 
out and documented. Our contribution is in outlining what is 
known, suggesting what needs to be found out, and showing how 
these matters should be thought about. This is not the last word 
on the restructuring of policing. It is an invitation to others to 
join in studying one of the most momentous but so far under- 
studied topics of our time. 
The report covers four topics. The first, and the longest 
part, describes the new forms that policing has taken in the late 
20th century (chapters  2,  3, 4). In so doing we make a crucial 
distinction between the auspices and the providers of policing. 
Auspices are groups, and sometimes individuals, who explicitly and 
self-consciously take upon themselves the responsibility for  0 
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4. 
groups that actually do the policing asked for (chapter  3). 
Sometimes, as we shall see, auspices and providers coincide. A 
defining characteristic of the new paradigm of policing, however, 
is that auspices and providers may not be the same. In the old 
4 
paradigm, governments had responsibility 'for  articulating security  t,, 
needs and also for developing institutions to meet them. 
I 
Distinguishing between auspices and providers allows us to 
escape from the oversimplification of describing policing as being 
either public or private. Auspices may be either public  ' 
,#  ,I 
(governmental)  or private  (non-governmental);  so too may 
providers. Furthermore, they may be combined in four ways - 
public/public, public/private, private/public, and 
private/private. The current restructuring of policing involves 
more,,  then, than privatization. It involves the 
multilateralization of the sources of both demand and supply of 
policing. We shall also see shortly that distinguishing public 
from private auspices conceptually is not easy. 
In order to describe what is happening today, it is important 
to determine whether there are characteristic differences in the 
practices of the new policing. Do these new combinations of 
auspices and providers carry out policing in new and different 
ways compared with the governmental, or public, police? We refer 
to these as the mentalities of policing, because they reflect 
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are discussed in chapter 4. 
The second major topic of our report is a d'iscussion  of the 
reasons that have produced the current restructuring of policing 
(chapter 5). Here we review all the explanations for the current 
restructuring that have been suggested by observers, scholars, and 
practitioners. 
'  In order to review what is happening to  policing and why, we 
organized a team of librarians and research assistants to help us 
search all the written material that might conceivably touch on 
contemporary policing and domestic security. Our review was 
limited to materials written in English. From this voluminous and 
diverse writing, we compiled lists of all auspices, providers, 
mentalities, and explanations that were mentioned. 
Chapter 6 raises a third topic, namely, the role that 
government is and should be playing in the formation of the new 
policing paradigm. Relatively little has been written about this 
because the extent of the transformation has not been recognized 
either by intellectuals or policy-makers. Reality has outrun 
efforts either to understand what is happening or to shape it to 
appropriate civic ends. 
Finally, building upon what we have found to be known about 
the restructuring of policing and the problems of governance that 
are thereby generated, we present a research agenda reflecting  0 
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It 
what we believe are the most important topics requiring study 
0 
(chapter  7).  We also suggest ways to go about this research. 
In a short conclusion (chapter  8), we reflect upon the 
, 
meaning of what is occurring and the prospects for policing in the 
future. 
, 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.",  ?"*I  13 
CHAPTER 2: AUSPICES 
Until recently governments assumed primary responsibility for 
providing security. "Providing" has a double meaning: governments 
determined what sort of security was needed and provided the means 
to achieve it. Governments were the organizational auspices for 
formulating demand for policing and they were the providers who 
supplied it. In the current restructuring of policing these two  , 
functions have become separate. Furthermore, it has become 
acceptable for groups other than governments both to take control 
of their own policing and to select the providers of it. In short, 
the responsibility for authorizing policing and for providing it 
instrumentally has been multilateralized and denationalized. 
a  This restructuring of policing is often referred to  as 
"privatization." This is an over-simplification, at the heart of 
which is a significant conceptual problem. The function of 
policing, that is, providing security through physical constraint, 
is a quintessential function of government. Many theorists have 
followed Max Weber's lead in defining states, which have been the 
most inclusive and powerful level of government in history, in 
terms of the possession of a "monopoly of force" (Weber  1968). In 
this formulation government is recognized in part by the control 
of policing. This implies that the capacity to authorize policing 
indicates the existence of government. It would follow, then, that 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
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policing can never be privatized. But this defies our common 
understanding. 
The fact is that the contemporary restructuring of polic,ing 
separates both the ,authorization  of security and the activity of 
policing from what we recognize as formal government. In so'doing, 
6 
the distinction between "public" 'and  "private" itself becomes 
1,  I 
problematic. This confusion also afflicts judgements about the 
public/private character of policing before the rise of states 
I 
(Bayley 1985). The problem becomes even more acute today when the 
auspices and providers of policing become mixed in terms'  of being 
"public" or "private", as we shall see. For these reasons we think 
,,  ,I 
it more accurate to characterize what is happening as 
multilateralization in the governance of security rather than the 
privatization of policing. 
In this chapter we will examine the sorts of people, for the 
most part groups, that undertake to authorize policing. We call 
these the auspices of security, as opposed to the providers of 
security who actually do the work of policing. Our review shows 
that control of policing today is being exercised by five 
different sets of auspices:  (1)  economic interests,  (2) 
residential communities, (3)  cultural communities,  (4) 
individuals, and  (5)  the state. Each category contains a variety 
of auspices. See Table 1. 
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(1)  Economic interests. The most familiar sub-set of these 
are businesses, which may act individually or cooperatively to 
organize security. Businesses create their own in-house security 
forces or hire others to police for them (Shearing  and Stenning 
1982, De Waard 1999, Johnston 1992). They also band together to 
protect themselves on the basis of both geography and function. In 
the,  United States, the best example of the former are "business  , 
improvement districts" which tax members to support police 
patrols, trash collection, or physical improvements to the 
environment  (New  York Times 1994, Greene, Seamon, and Levy 1995, 
Murp:hy 1997). In New York City, there are BID'S for Times Square, 
Grand Central Terminal, Bryant Park, and 34th Street mid-town, 
among others. Businesses that provide a common service, such as 
banks, bars, and taxi companies, also collaborate to enhance 
mutual security. These functional economic interests are less 
1ike:Ly than geographical-based ones to hire and share police. 
Instead, they work cooperatively to minimize threats to their 
common enterprise by warning one another about potential threats, 
sharJ-ng  ideas about improving security, and supporting one another 
in time of need. 
Unfortunately, the economic interests active in constructing 
security are not always legal. In many parts of the world, 
criminal enterprises, such as crime syndicates and juvenile gangs, 
a  play a significant role in organizing security. They do so in 
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their own interest, of course, and usually in direct opposition to  'a 
government. But in so doing they govern security for the people 
amon'g  whom they live, becoming in some places the only effective 
police that may exist. Such illegal but parallel security regimes 
, 
that create order benefiting others exist and have existed in 
Mafia-dominated neighborhoods in New York'  City, the favellas of 
t 
I,, 
Latiin America, the barrios of Los Angeles, and the major cities of 
Russia  (Leeds 1996, Shlapentokh 1995). Violent revolutionary 
I 
groups, as well, often try to establish parallel governments in 
the geographical areas they dominate, serving both as the local 
,.  ,I 
police and military. 
Governments may be complicit in these parallel but illegal 
security activities. The public police sometimes turn a blind-eye  a 
to the illegal activities of crime groups in exchange for 
information that helps them solve crimes, especially if those 
crimes threaten the government. The Royal Ulster Constabulary,'  for 
example, depended upon warnings by the Irish Republican Army  (IRA) 
about: impending bombings in order to protect the general 
population. The RUC, in turn, allowed the IRA to become the 
effective police for several Catholic "no-go" areas of Belfast 
(Hillyard 1993). In some areas the IRA established  "Provo Police 
Stations" to address community problems as well as to document 
abuses by the RUC. Similarly, Japan's organized crime -  the Yakuza 
0  - performs the useful function of enlisting and disciplining 
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unemployed and potentially delinquent young men  ("chimpera")  who 
would otherwise gravitate toward predatory crime. Although the 
Japanese police periodically crack down against the Yakuza, there 
seems to be an informal understanding that the rigor of 
enforcement will be influenced by the Yakuza's adherence to 
certain rules, specifically whether they victimize the public 
diyectly  (Bayley  1991, Szymkowak and Steinhoff 1995). Violence 
among the Yakuza themselves is tolerable, provided it is kept out 
of public view; violence against the public is not. As a final 
examlple, the conduct of the so-called "good Donos"  (drug  lords) of 
Brazil is often tacitly tolerated by the public police because 
they help to maintain order  (Leeds  1996).  Tolerance runs out, 
however, when drug-trade violence is turned on the public. 
Furthermore, corrupt governments may actively foster parallel 
but illegal security activities. In Russia, for instance, members 
of the government have been observed to provide and solicit 
illegitimate krysha  (roofs)  of security for themselves and favored 
members of the private sector (Shlapentokh  1995). 
The general point is that criminal enterprises may be "cut 
some slack" by governments provided they contribute to public 
safety in ways the public police cannot. They may even be actively 
courted by corrupt state agencies in service to their own 
inte.rests. 
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(2)  Communities of residence. These come in many forms. 
First: there are gated-communities where policing is constructed 
either by realty companies or by the homeowners themselves 
operating as a cooperative. Our impression is that the former is 
more common in private housing estates -  horizontal gated- 
communities; the latter is more common with condominium apartments 
-  vertical gated-communities. In gated-communities policing 
involves regulating access, surveillance, and patrolling. Gated 
/I  , 
communities are especially popular in the United States, where 
they have been the fastest growing segment of the housing market 
(Egan  1995, Kennedy 1995, Blakely and Snyder 1997, Garreau 1991, 
Jones and Newburn 1999, Owens 1997).  a  It is worth noting in passing that creating gates for 
communities does not happen exclusively under private auspices. 
When the public police barricade streets to create cul-de-sacs 
that impede drive-by criminal activity, as in Houston and Los 
Angeles in the 1980s, they are creating gated-communities too, and 
often for the poor  (Sparrow  et al. 1990). 
Second: residents of neighborhoods sometimes agree to pay a 
smal.1  fee on a per capita basis for the support of private 
security services. This has happened recently in parts of 
Melbourne, Australia, Glasgow, Scotland, and London, England. Such 
practice demonstrates again the problem with describing security 
auspices as being either public or private. The financial levies 
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agreed to could be regarded as a form of local government or as  a 
non-governmental self-help. In cases iike these, cooperative 
activity looks very much like self-government. 
Third: residential neighborhoods may form ad hoc advisory 
councils that mobilize in-kind community resources to address 
security needs  (Blakely  and Snyder 1997, Baron 1998). For example, 
residents may undertake to watch one another's  houses, alert 
police to suspicious strangers, patrol the streets at certain 
I 
times of the day, improve dangerous physical conditions, mediate 
neighborhood disputes, and organize restorative justice 
conf:erences (Braithwaite  1989, Bayley 1994, Shearing 1995). Rachel 
Neild, writing about Latin America, calls this the 
"inf!ormalization"  of security (1997). In the United States, some  a 
communities have been given grants by government to support the 
security plans they have developed (Office  of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention 1998). Similar initiatives have been  ' 
undertaken in South Africa and Ireland (Shearing  1997, ICPNI 
1999')  . 
In traditional societies, whole villages may organize to take 
responsibility for security, supplementing what is regarded as 
inadequate protection by the public police. As in developed 
settings, it is difficult to know whether such activity should be 
regarded as public or private. In India, for example, the 
0  government passed legislation authorizing villages to create 
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"village defense forces" and paying some of their costs. In  a  - 
Tanzania the government sponsored vigilante groups  ("sungusungu") 
to protect cattle from rustlers (Bukurura  1993).  In addition, 
various non-governmental have sponsored local security initiatives 
facilitated by micro-lending and technology transfer (Cassani 
1995, Conger 1997). Should these be regarded as devolution to 
private auspices or decentralization to local-government auspices? 
On the other hand, if villages take advantage of opportunities 
within the law to organize their own self-defense, even though not 
explicitly authorized to do so, is this local government or 
private policing? We submit that this sort of argument can be 
avoided altogether by not using the "public/private" terminology 
when describing the current restructuring of policing, except 
, 
where their application is unambiguous. 
The concept of "centralization/decentralization" also becomes 
difficult to apply in this context. The new paradigm of policing 
represents more than decentralization within existing governmental 
institutions. Governments are not just devolving power on 
subordinate levels of government, they are accepting new bases of 
legitimate government.  And they are doing more than acquiescing; 
sometimes they are actively promoting the sharing of the 
responsibility for policing to new institutions, as we shall see. 
(3)  Cultural communities. These may be ascriptive groups 
0  where membership is a matter of inheritance or voluntary 
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associations that people join by choice. In either case, groups  *  - 
with which people identify because of shared cultural beliefs and 
practices occasionally serve as auspices for the construction of 
poli.cing (Stenson 1999, Stenson and Factor 1994). In the United 
Stat.es,  for example, the Nation of Islam, often called "Black 
Muslims," has organized a group of young men known as the Fruit of 
Islam to protect members and their businesses. The Rashtriya 
Swayamsezak Sangh  (RSS)  in India is a militant band of primarily 
young men whose avowed purpose is the physical defense of Hindus. 
(4)  Individuals. Individuals have always been auspices of 
policing in the sense that they worry about security, think about 
ways to minimize risk, and act so as to enhance their personal 
safety. Self-defense is accepted everywhere as a human right, 
although it may be regulated by the state. Today people in many 
countries go to elaborate lengths to protect themselves -  residing 
in protected communities, living in houses designed for security, 
avoiding dangerous areas, attending self-defense classes, buying 
security equipment, and joining crime-prevention organizations. 
Most importantly for our analysis, they also hire their own human 
protectors. It stands to reason that private guards are nost often 
hired by people of wealth, although relatively poor people engaged 
in unpopular or criminal enterprises hire body-guards too. Our 
impression is that individual self-defense, especially the hiring 
0  of private guards, is much more common in less-developed 
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surrounded by high walls topped with broken glass or barbed wire. 
In Latin America, for example, wealthy individuals have hired 
private police to protect themselves and their families from an 
epidemic of kidnapping  (Heine  1994). Due to the turbulence of 
poli.tica1  life, politicians in less-developed countries also 
frequently employ private guards who are sometimes used 
offensively against their opponents as well as defensively. This 
is also true in Russia  (Shlapentokh 1995). 
(5)  The state. During the past century, governments'have  been 
both the primary auspice and the primary provider of policing. 
Paradoxically, however, they have also, in their role as 
authorizers of policing, contributed substantially to the current 
multilateralization of policing, the very phenomenon which is 
undermining their monopoly. In recent years, governments have 
facilitated, encouraged, and required non-governmental groups'to 
become both auspices for authorizing policing and providers of it. 
They have done so in two ways -  by creating permissive 
environments and by actively encouraging non-state police 
activity. 
Passive encouragement has come primarily through the creation 
of legal space into which non-state auspices could expand  (Hauber 
et a.1.  1996, De Waard 1999, Willemse 1996). In the United States, 
0  for example, businesses have defensively protected themselves 
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their employees or customers (Benson  1998).  The law also allows 
owners of businesses to regulate the access of people who violate 
rules of dress and behavior. This legal environment coupled with 
the expansion of so-called "mass private property" - premises 
privately owned but open to the public -  has made possible, even 
neqessary, a new territorial division-of-labor between public and 
private police  (Shearing  and Stenning 1981). Finally, by requiring 
providers of certain public services to be insured, government has 
created a set of security monitors who can create financial 
incentives for businesses to improve their security performance. 
Governments that permit private persons to be armed in their 
own defense, as in the United States, legitimate the notion that  ' 
even the use of deadly force is not the monopoly of states. 
Governments may even enable people to share the coercive 
power of the police. They do this when they permit private persons 
to be armed in their own defense, as in the United States. 
Ironically, this not only undermines their monopoly on the use of 
force but it encourages the notion that public policing is 
inadequate. 
But governments have not simply acquiesced in allowing non- 
governmental groups and individuals to authorize. They have 
actively encouraged them in several ways. 
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policing. The best example is the community-policing movement of 
the 1980s and 90s (Skogan  and Hartnet 1997, Skolnick and Bayley, 
1986, 1988; Greene and Mastrofski 1988, Goldstein 1990, 
Trojanowicz n.d., Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, Stenson 1999, 
Stenson and Factor 1994, Crawford 1995, Crawford and Jones 1995, 
oJ,pP  1998). Acting on the insight that crime cannot be prevented, 
or iiolved without the active assistance of the public, police 
departments have mobilized neighborhoods in their own defense 
(Bayley  1994). Members of the public collectively consider 
security needs, advise the police about problems requiring 
attention, give information to the police about suspicious 
pers,ons,  patrol neighborhoods on foot and in cars, fix up the 
physical environment, mediate disputes and quarrels, install 
security devices, force businesses that cause disorder to move, 
and pressure fellow residents to adhere to community norms of 
propriety. In the language of the day, community policing seeks to 
"empower" neighborhoods to share responsibility for policing with 
the state  (Crawford 1994, Crawford and Jones 1995, OJJDP 1998). 
Some local governments have directly sponsored commercial 
private policing. For example, several municipalities in Montreal 
hired private police to augment the patrols of the Metropolitan 
police. By 1998 within the jurisdictions of 18 of Britain's 43 
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police forces, local governments had hired private security 
patrols  (Blair 1998). 
Private security companies working for the state should be 
distinguished from low cost quasi-police agents who work side-by- 
side with the public police. In the Netherlands, for example, most 
towns now have City Guards  (Stadswacht)  to patrol high-use public 
areas. Similar agents known as "Sicherheitswachen" have emerged in, 
Germany, where they perform surveillance functions, including 
stopping people on the street and requesting identity cards 
(Nogalla and Sack 1998; Lacey and Zedner 1998) In Britain, several 
towns have hired long-term unemployed people as "City Stewards'' or 
"social caretakers'' to patrol public housing estates (Blair  1998). 
All of these "policing" agents receive minimal training and pay. 
They chief function is to be visible and to alert the public 
police to real or potential dangers. 
Second: governments have enacted regulations requiring 
private persons to act in ways that enhance public safety. For 
example, they require banks to transport cash in approved ways, 
hospitals to report suspected child abuse, airlines to inspect 
hand--baggage,  gun-owners to register, people in sensitive 
occupations to submit to backgrounds checks, sporting events to be 
covered by private guards, construction companies to  manage 
traffic around building sites, and ethnic groups to follow 
stiDulated rules for Darades and fairs (Graboskv  1995). 
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carried out by the public police to private contractors. Police in 
many countries have "out-sourced" the housing and transporting 
prisoners, street patrolling, guarding of public buildings, 
investigating traffic accidents, monitoring parolees 
electronically, advising businesses about'  security, and offering 
crime-prevention workshops for at-risk populations  (Johnston 
1994). James Q. Wilson suggested thirty years ago that since most 
I 
of the calls to the police for assistance involved non-criminal 
matters, governments could save a great of money by turning this 
responsibility over to private firms (1968). Farfetched at the 
time, a great deal of public policing has since become 
"commodified" in just the way he suggested  (Wood 1999, Spitzer and 
Scull 1977). According to Peter Manning, the largest employer of 
priv,ate  security in the United States is in fact the federal 
government  (Forst  and Manning forthcoming). 
Fourth: governments invite firms to collaborate with them in 
improving public policing. In Durban, South Africa, the public 
police share a communication channel and computer with a private 
security company. The private firm often responds first to 
criminal emergencies, preserving the scene until the public police 
arrive. In the United States, Australia, and Canada, private 
businesses have been solicited to purchase equipment, such as 
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and furniture for neighborhood police posts. 
In our discussion of the role governments have played in 
facilitating multilateralization, we are not suggesting that 
governments have been the prime movers. For the most part, they 
have been playing "catch up." The government's monopoly on 
policing has been eroded because it has not provided the sort of  , 
effective consumer-responsive security that private auspices and 
suppliers have proved capable of giving. 
Conclusion 
The United States is often criticized by foreigners for 
having an ungovernable police system composed of over 17,000 
separate police forces. Indeed, Bruce Smith, a famous authority on 
the American police, said that the United States didn't  have a 
police system at all  (1949).  This radically decentralized system 
produces for Americans many of the benefits achieved elsewhere 
through community policing, because it represents restructuring on 
the :basis  of neighborhoods. Americans properly describe their 
syst'em  as "decentralized" because it occurs within a 
constitutional established system of government. But when the same 
func.tions  are authorized by "unincorporated" neighborhoods or 
residential communities that are no larger than the jurisdictions 
of many local governments, they are seen as being "private." The 
point is that when it comes to policing, what is governmental and  0 
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than either the nature of  the activity undertaken or the size of 
the entity undertaking it. 
0 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.E  c  on  omi  c 
TABLE 1: Non-State Auspices of  Security 
(1)  Legal  : businesses 
(a)  Singly 
(b)  Coop'eratively 
(2)  Illegal: criminal gangs 
Residential 
(1)  Gated communities -  horizontal and vertical 
(a)'  By real estate company 
(b)  (By  cooperatives 
(2)  Voluntary capitation 
(3)  Local utilization of in-kind resources 
(a)  By local initiative 




(1)  Permitting 
(2)  Encouraging 
(a)  By sponsoring 
(b)  By requiring 
(c)  By delegating 
(d)  By collaborating 
'  29 
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CHAPTER 111: PROVIDERS 
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Security companies like Burns, Wackenhut, and Pinkerton 
represent what most people think of when they hear the phrase 
"private policing"  (De  Waard 1999). But large commercial security 
companies are only the tip of the iceberg of restructuring. They 
are providers of policing, but they do not authorize it. And they 
are only one sort of  non-state provider among several. In our 
surveyr  we have found four major groups of policing providers in 
the :Late 20th century world:  (1)  commercial security companies, 
(2)  non-state auspices acting as their own providers,  (3) 
individuals, and  (4)  governments. See Table 2. Governments are 
included, paradoxically, because they contribute police services 
through the market to non-state policing auspices. 
(1)  Commercial security companies. The archetypical private 
security company is one that provides uniformed security personnel 
to guard and patrol. They are particularly visible in malls, 
banks, large stores, and sport stadiums -  places which are 
privately owned but to which the public has access. They also 
protect private housing and businesses that are not open to the 
general public, such as gated communities and factories. But 
commercial companies provide many other sorts of security 
personnel as well, such as inquiry agents, personal bodyguards, 
security consultants, control room operators for closed circuit-TV 
and police communications, manufacturers and sellers of security 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.4  31 
I 
,I 
equipment, installers and repairers of security equipment, and 
trainers in personal protection  (Prezler and Sarre 1998). All 
these functionally varied companies offer themselves through the 
market, filling gaps in "policing" that governments cannot or will 
, 
not. 
(2)  Non-governmental auspices  1  Private groups as well as 
individuals may take security into their own hands, as we have 
seen, supplementing or supplanting the protection provided by 
I 
governments. They may decide to provide protection themselves, 
becoming providers, or to hire commercial firms. Many large 
I,  ,I 
businesses, for example, create their own in-house police forces. 
So, too, do developers of some large housing estates. Guards for 
apartment buildings and condominiums may be employees of outside 
firms or of the housing complex itself. Neighborhoods provide 
policing to themselves when residents join Neighborhood Watch or 
servle in foot- or mobile-patrols  (Johnston 1992)  . 
The Guardian Angels in the United States are an interesting 
hybrid of the inside/outside provision of policing. Composed for 
the most part of young men from minority communities, they provide 
visible patrol to selected neighborhoods and businesses that 
request their services. They are outsiders in service to local 
auspices, sometimes working as volunteers, sometimes for a fee. 
Criminal organizations, too, by protecting themselves 
0  sometimes protect others as well, as in the favellas of Rio, the 
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barrios of Colombia, the bustees of India, and immigrant  * 
neighborhoods of American cities. In these cases, private auspices 
operating in their own illegal interest create a public good.. 
(3)  Individuals. Individuals become providers of policing 
I 
when they undertake protective actions on others' behalf, fo'r 
example, as volunteers in neighborhood street patrols, 
t 
Special 
Constables in Britain, police cadets and reserves in the United 
States, and Police Explorer Scouts. Individuals also take self- 
I 
protecting defensive actions, such as purchasing firearms OL 
taking martial arts classes. Since we have defined polici'ng  as a 
collective action for collective benefit, self-defense activities 
do not qualify individuals as providers,of  policing. 
(Bukurura 1993). Individuals may be both the auspices and 
providers of policing, not necessarily at the same time. 
(4)  Governments. One of the most curious developments of 
modern policing is the public police acting as private suppliers 
of protection. The assumption behind government policing is that 
it is available to everyone equally on the basis of citizenship. 
Increasingly, however, the public police are offering their 
servi-ces  through the marketplace for profit. This takes two forms. 
First: Some governments allow individual officers to work 
off-duty for private interests in their official uniforms, thus as 
visible ''police". In the United States this represents the 
0  expansion of an older practice of allowing police officers to 
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"moonlight" as completely private persons for private security 
companies  (Reiss  1988; Bayley 1994). For American police officers,  a 
the opportunity to work "two jobs" is a prized benefit of police 
empl.  o  ymen  t  . 
Moonlighting may be highly organized. Some American police 
departments sign contracts with private interests to provide 
uniformed police off-duty. In Honduras, too, in the late 1980s, 
the Public Security Force  (FUSEP)  contracted with businesses to 
provide security guards  (Kincaid and Gamarra 1995). 
Second: Many police forces, especially in North America, now 
charge for services they used to provide free, such as responding 
to burglar alarms and regulating traffic around construction 
sites. They do so on the argument that because these efforts  a 
disproportionately benefit a commercial interest, the general 
public should not bear the cost. The same is true for policing 
rock concerts, sporting events, and special-interest parades. 
In this way the profit-motive has begun to affect the 
allocation of public policing. Private interests have tried to do 
this in less obvious ways for many years. For example, fast-food 
restaurants and convenience stores, especially if they operate 
around-the-clock, sometimes provide food free or at concessional 
rates to police to encourage their patronage and hence protection. 
More overtly, businesses may offer in-kind support, such as 
@  equipment or buildings, to the police in exchange for increased 
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coverage. The Alliance for Downtown New York,  for example, 
recently offered the police department $5 million to set up a new 
police sub-station on Washington Street if it would assign 40, 
police offices to p'atrol  the area south of Chambers Street  (NYT 
1998). Such practi,ces  have been an integral part of some 
comniunity-policing programs, as police departments required local 
4 
(4, 
comrriunities to provide office space, furniture, and equipment in 
order to obtain a neighborhood  ("storefront") police station. 
I 
In all these examples, public policing is no longer being 
treated as a public good, available equally to all,and,paid  for by 
general tax revenues. It has become a publicly created service 
that can be sold as a commodity through mark,ets. 
None of this should be confused with the civilianization of  0 
police, where tasks formerly carried out by sworn officers are 
performed by civilian employees. Civilians, who make up 30% of 
police employees in Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United 
States, now direct traffic, investigate accidents, collect 
physical evidence, and organize crime prevention activities. 
Non-sworn people sometimes work.in police-like roles, often in 
uniforms that are very similar to those of sworn officers. 
Without a hard look, it has become difficult to tell whether 
policing is being done by government using sworn personnel, by 
government using a private security company, by a private security 
company using civilian employees, by a private company using 
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firearms does not always distinguish public from non-public 
providers  (Forst  and Manning forthcoming). Interestingly, a 
4  0 
politician in Australia recommended recently that the private 
security guards already deployed by government on trains should be 
armed so that they would not be regarded as Keystone Cops  (Sunday 
Sun-Herald, 14 Feb 99). Guns, he thought, were 'Ian 
absolute  ...  necessity to cope with the job." 
Today, a distinction between public and private policing is 
increasingly meaningless. The world has come a long,,way  since the 
Cunningham Report  (1985)  documented the size of the private 
entities provide policing to these auspices. Even government's 
role is no longer exclusively public. It authorizes policing, 
encourages non-governmental groups to authorize policing, provides 
policing, and provides policing to specialized consumers on a fee- 
for-service basis. Similarly, private providers are not 
exclusively private, since they sometimes work for public auspices 
and are sometimes staffed by public police personnel. 
Policing today is not just being "privatized." It is being 
restructured though the development of new groups as both 
insti-gators  and providers of policing. The public and the private 
are being combined in new ways, ways that sometimes make it 
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difficult to separate public from private. "Multilateralization," 
although an awkward term, is more accurate way of describing what 
is happening to policing in the late 20th century than 
"privatization.  'I 
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TABLE  2 
Non-State Providers 
(1)  Commercial security companies 
(2)  Non-governmental auspices 
E.g. industries, real estate developers, apartment and 
condominium cooperatives, neighborhoods. 
(3),  Individuals 
(4) Governments 
(a)  Moonlighting 
(b)  Fees-for service 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.38 
,I 
CHAPTER IV: MENTALITIES 
The restructuring of policing that is underway in the world 
today involves more than changes in the sorts of people who are 
involved in it. The character of policing is also changing, 
meaning its practices and activities. We call these the 
"mentalities" of policing because they how policing is conducted 
48, 
reflects distinctive ways of thinking about it. . 
It is important to distinguish the tasks that "police" 
undertake from the mentalities they adopt. While different 
auspices may require different sorts of services from their 
providers, the functions may be performed differently by different 
providers. The extent to which this is so is an important topic 
for future research. This research will be complicated because 
auspices and providers may independently influence the way in 
which similar tasks are performed. Furthermore, because state- and 
non-state auspices and providers may be combined in different' 
combinations, as we have seen, the relations between 
auspices/providers, on the one hand, and the mentalities of 
policing, on the other, may be very complex. 
We respect to the functions of policing, we agree with Les 
Johnston that non-state providers of security now perform all the 
tasks once reserved to the public police  (Johnston 1992).  They 
patrol, guard, investigate, respond to emergencies, monitor, 
collect intelligence, work undercover, constrain, ameliorate  0 
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crime-producing conditions, advise about crime prevention, and 
control disorder. The tasks of policing are increasingly being 
shared between public and private providers. 
Historically the two core tasks of public policing have been 
patrolling and criminal investigation  (Bayley  1994). Whereas 
investigation has long been a specialty of commercial security 
companies as well as in-house security agencies, patrol has not 
been until recently. Today the employed and consuming public are 
as likely to see private security personnel guarding and 
patrolling in the course of a day than public police. In addition 
to providing a visible presence, private police necessarily 
39 
respond to emergencies and, when crimes occur, preserve evidence 
and hold suspects until the public police arrive. 
In Britain, street patrolling is being performed today by the 
public police, private security privately employed, private 
security employed by municipalities, unsworn but uniformed 
personnel hired by municipalities, constabularies with 
jurisdiction in particular places such as parks or housing 
estates, and community volunteers  (Bayley  1994, Johnston 1994). In 
many places these varied forces work side by side, sharing 
offices, radio frequencies, information, and plans. 
Private providers have one major advantage over the public 
police with respect to the tasks they perform -  they can pick and 
choose. The public police, on the other hand, must provide the  0 
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full range of police services, an obligation they find 
increasingly burdensome and have begun to take steps to reduce. 
The insight that private policing exhibits a different 
mentality from public policing’s  was formulated originally by 
Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning and has since been 
elaborated by others (Shearing  and Stenning 1980, Farnell and 
She.ai:ing  1977; Shearing, Farnell, and Stenning 1980, Prenzler and 
Saare 1998; Forst and Manning 1999). The consensus is that private 
/,I , 
policing is more concerned with preventing crime than punishing 
it. Rather than deterring crime through the threat of detection, 
arrest, and punishment, private policing tries to regulate 
behavior and circumstances so as to diminish the possibility that 
crime will occur. In so doing, it focuses less on people who are  a 
behaving unreasonably and more on reasonable people who will 
comply with crime- and disorder-reducing directives. By 
emphasizing the responsibilities of all, private security tries to 
create an environment of discipline and order that limits 
opportunities for crime, reassures law-abiding people, and 
constrains the deviant few. 
The mentality of private policing is similar to that of self- 
help by individuals: conciliatory rather than penal, emphasizing 
desistance rather than punishment, concerned with outcomes more 
than rules, and speedy rather than measured  (Black  and Baumgartner 
1980). 
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limits participation, and excludes on the basis of presumptive signs of good behavior - 
membership (residence, employment), dress (T-shirts, bare feet), and behavior (obscene 
language, skateboards, boom boxes). It can do what the public police have recently come under 
strong attack for doing - it can profile. It can take premonitory action on the basis of social 
(I 
criteria that do not have to be justified in terms of law. Unlike the public police, private police 
are not hampered in their regulatory actions by  "probable cause." 
The restructuring of policing results in the substitution of banishment for incarceration. 
Governments can banish only by  incarcerating, and that can only be done on the basis of 
behavior adjudicated to be illegal. Private agents can banish by regulation based on presumptive 
signs of deviancy and disorder. 
Private security is primarily concerned with governing the future: its objective is to prevent 
crime. Public policing is concerned with governing both the future and the past: preventing crime 
and rendering justice with respect to past crimes. Its favored strategy is deterrence based on 
punishment because punishment promises both to prevent crime and to exact a cost for misdeeds 
already done. This explains why the mentality of punishment is so popular with the public as 
well. It is an all-purpose solution to two important concerns. Restructuring has 
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occurred today in part because groups within the state, notably  a 
businesses, realized that they would be better protected if they 
uncoupled security from justice, which the public police cannot 
do. The new auspices and providers of security are more interested 
in reducing losses than in validating legal norms. Consequently, 
they also rely less on deterrence and more on premonitory 
prevention. It may also be true that when private police are 
called upon to do justice, they act in a less punishment-oriented 
'II  , 
way. Shearing, Stenning, and Braithwaite have all argued that 
private policing is more likely than public policing to act 
according to principles of "restorative justice" (Shearing  and 
Stenning 1980, Braithwaite 1989). 
We are arguing that changing the governance of security can 
affect the way in which justice is done. The converse may also be 
true: the way in which justice is done can affect the achievement 
of security (Bayley  1999). Restorative justice conferences seek to 
produce undertakings among all parties that reduce the chances 
that re-offending will occur. In the search for justice locally 
understood and accepted, the conferences also engage in policing. 
The lesson is that security and justice are intimately linked, but 
not exclusively through punishment. 
Dichotomizing the mentalities of public and private providers 
of policing is, of course, too simplistic. We are not saying that 
0  all non-governmental providers of policing exhibit one mentality 
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describing the poles of a continuum along which the mentalities of 
policing can be arrayed. Private providers of policing are not 
always "warm and fuzzy," but can behave punitively, illegally, and 
brutally. Conversely, governments are learning to incorporate some 
of the mentalities of private policing. In the last twenty years, 
public police agencies throughout the world have consulted with  , 
communities about security needs, adapted their tactics to local 
(1, 
circumstances, encouraged neighborhoods to work cooperatively with 
them, and proactively changed conditions that breed danger, 
violence, and disorder  (Bayley  1994, Skogan and Hartnet 1997). 
Similarly, they have used the civil law to pressure landlords and 
other "guardians" of private space to control access, evict 
disruptive persons, improve physical conditions, and monitor 
behavior. Called "third-party policing," these practices conform 
to a compliance model of policing similar to what private police 
do (Buerger  and Mazerolle 1998; Reiss 1987). 
The public police have also begun to adopt a familiar 
technological tactic of private police: they are using closed- 
circuit television to monitor behavior in public places. 
Electronic patrolling has moved from banks, stores, and hotel 
lobbies to streets, parks, and transportation hubs. TV cameras now 
monitor traffic flow and can detect individual violators of 
0  traffic regulations. In Britain by the mid-90st 550 close-circuit 
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television surveillance programs had been approved by the Home 
Office, involving over 5,000 cameras  (Blair 1989). 
It is worth remarking that the mentalities associated with 
private policing may have been operating in one sector of 
government policing for many years, namely, the policing of' 
t,  military personnel. Military police operate in a controlled 
environment with a population subject to a host of disciplinary 
sanctions not available to the public police. The study of 
military policing, long neglected, may provide valuable insights 
into the conditions required to institutionalize the mentalities 
of private policing in public policing. 
Finally, public and private policing may be moving toward a 
division-of-labor where the public police increasingly specialize 
in investigations and counter-force operations while private 
police become decentralized, full-service provides of visible 
crime prevention. There are signs in Europe and America that this 
is occurring. For all the heartening signs that public police are 
adopting community-oriented crime-prevention strategies, there are 
counter-indications that they are focusing more on threats to 
society at large, such as drugs and terrorism, rather than crimes 
directed at individuals, that law enforcement is the tool of 
choice, that proactive undercover operations are gaining in 
importance, and that military equipment and tactics are being used 
more often  (Kraska  1996, Kraska and Cubellis 1997). Private  @ 
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0 
policing, by contrast, specializes in risk-reduction, focuses on 
ordinary crime and disorder, stresses visibility and availability, 
seeks compliance rather than punishment, and eschews 
confrontational tactics. If this division-of-labor were to become 
, 
structured by class, as is likely, with public policing for the 
I 
(4  poor and private policing for the rich, the consequences for 
social justice, equality before the law, and political stability 
would be serious  (Bayley  and Shearing 1996). 
I 
Whether we are right or wrong about this trend, the point to 
underscore is that the connections between who authorizes  ,, 
84 
policing, who provides it, and how it is done need to be studied. 
Not only may they not be independent of one another, but their 
distribution socially has enormous political'  implications for the  0 
future. 
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After a prolonged period in which nation-states gradually 
monopolized policing, why have groups outside the state undertaken 
to de-velop  it on their own now? The research literature on 
policing and the evolution of government offers many suggestions 
and some agreement on a few major factors. We will describe these 
hypotheses and then offer some comments of our own. 
Hypotheses 
The explanations suggested can be grouped into seven major 
categories -  government performance, crime, economics, political 
character, social relations, ideas, and culture. We discuss them 
in declining order of importance as reflected in the literature 
reviewed. 
A. Government Performance. The failure of government to 
provide adequate police protection is the most common reason cited 
for today's restructuring of policing  (Sklansky 1999, Johnston 
1992,,  1999). This explanation seems intuitively correct but not 
very informative, since it would be irrational for people to 
concertedly construct new forms of policing unless the existing 
system was perceived to be inadequate. More helpfully, five 
hypotheses have been suggested about the particular ways in which 
the actions of government have led to policing's reconstruction. 
(1)  Faith in the public criminal justice system has 
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declined because it is perceived to be unable to punish criminals  a  - 
successfully because of a growing number of procedural rules 
(Herrnstein and Wilson 1994, Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, Lunney 
1989). Consequently\,  people doubt that it can be an effective 
deterrent to crime  (Herbert Packer 1968). This has increased the 
attractiveness of more locally focused pr'evention  systems based on 
6 
I,  ' 
regulation and compliance has risen rather than formal law  (Reiss 
1984). 
I 
The ability of the police to intervene in community life through 
premonitory regulation has also been diminished in many countries 
by the decriminalization of public-order offenses, such as 
loitering, panhandling, drinking in public, and lewdness. 
(2)  Governments have become much more cost-conscious due 
to declining revenue are therefore more willing than in the past 
to share responsibility for crime control, and other functions, to 
private auspices  (Shearing and Stenning 1980). For example, local 
governments in Britain and the Netherlands have tried to reduce 
the cost of policing by creating city watches and guards  (Blair, 
1998). The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire even proposed in 1994 
to create its own security force of  Special Constables that would 
compete with private security companies. In Australia, a committee 
on work-force reform in New South Wales suggested that the police 
hire "Career Constables" on short-term contracts at low rates of 
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emergency response  (Anonymous  1998). 
Governments around the world have reduced the functions their 
4 
police are expectedl  to perform  ("load-shedding")  .  In Britain, for 
example, there have been several major reviews of the 
responsibilities of the police during the last decade, all 
4 
recc'mmending  a reduction (Home  Office 1995, Sheehy Committee 1993, 
Cassels Committee 1996). The Home Office Review of Police Core and 
I 
Ancillary Tasks  (1995)  recommended giving up 26 functions. 
Cost-consciousness also accounts for the rapid pace'of 
,#  ,I 
civilianization over the past few years, as well as the hiring of 
(3)  The development of the professional police model in 
the 20th century narrowed the focus of public policing, 
disconnected it from communities, and weakened its ability to' 
reduce risk and prevent crime  (Kelling  and Moore 1988; Kelling and 
Coles 1996; Goldstein 1990). Order-maintenance gave way to crime- 
fighting, meaning preoccupation with the investigation and 
punishment of criminals; deterrence replaced informal regulation 
(Kelling  and Moore 1988, Monkonnen 1981). The separation between 
police and their communities was further intensified by the 
professionalization of social services, notably social work, 
psychological counseling, and family mediation. Police officers no 
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specialists in law enforcement. The movement to remake public  0 
policing through community policing in the last 20 years 
explicitly recognized these defects in public policing. 
(4)  The public police are increasingly perceived to be 
corrupt, brutal, and unreliable, especially in less-developed 
countries. People would rather take security into their own hands 
than trust discredited government police. This perception has 
grown in part as a result of the "democratization" of previously 
repressive governments that followed the collapse of the Communist 
bloc. Stories about official misconduct th'at  were once suppressed 
are :now  more freely publicized. 
~~ 
(5)  Businesses, especially in North America, have felt a 
grow.ing  need to protect themselves against the financial risk of 
being sued for failing to protect adequately their employees or 
customers. Concerned about legal liability, they created police 
forces that would focus exclusively on reducing risk to themselves 
(Sklansky 1998). 
B. Crime. Crime has risen sharply in the last 40 years and 
with it the public's fear of crime (Prezler  and Saare 1998). This 
fear has been magnified by what are perceived to be new criminal 
threats in some countries, such as kidnapping of businessmen and 
their families in Latin America and international terrorism in the 
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United States. The world is in a "moral panic" about crime 
(Johnston  1992, Caldeira 1996). 
This "moral panic" may be part of the constellation of 
forces that are leading to the very police restructuring that it 
is helping to bring about. 
First: with the growth of market-capitalism around the world, 
media have become increasingly commercialized and free of 
11.1 
governmental control. Knowing that crime "sells," worldwide media 
conglomerates exaggerate the threat of crime by highlighting the 
most. sensational crimes wherever they occur  (Chermak  1995). 
Second: increasing competition in the policing market leads 
all providers, public and private, to exaggerate the danger from 
criminal activity. In this way the restructuring of policing 
I 
becomes self-reinforcing after a certain threshold has been 
reached. 
Third: the more people are mobilized to protect themselves, 
the greater becomes their fear. Protective activity, such as 
installing burglar and car alarms, heightens rather than allays 
fear. In effect, supplying protection increases the demand for it 
(Loader  1997). 
For all these reasons, the public's expectations about what 
constitutes reasonable security have risen. But people are also 
convinced that risk can be reduced. They believe what providers 
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right, which means by non-governmental agencies. 
C. Economics. Three hypotheses have been put forward under 
this heading. 
(1)  Policing has become increasingly "commodified,  'I  a 
4,  service to be bought and sold, due to the expansion of free- 
enterprise economic systems internationally  (Sklansky 1999, Kaplan 
1998, Johnston 1999). It should be noted that this hypothesis 
I 
applies to only one sector of the restructuring phenomenon, 
namely, commercial, for-profit policing. Moreover, it is'  not clear 
why the existence of markets creates the commercialization of 
poli-cing  specifically. To be sure, without markets there would be 
no commodification. But policing has not always been as  0 
commodified as it currently is even in market-economies. 
(2)  A particular form of property, namely, "mass private 
property,'' has expanded in the last half century that requires a 
different sort of policing  (Shearing  and Stenning 1981). When 
private entrepreneurs expand facilities to which the public has 
access, such as shopping malls, large retail stores, cinemas, and 
sports complexes, the responsibility of owners to provide security 
grows, especially in an environment of legal liability. In this 
setting it is more important for policing to  manage risk than to 
assign blame. 
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Drawing on the work of Spitzer and Scull, Shearing and 
Stenning have generated a larger principle, namely, that non- 
governmental policing expands regardless of  the nature of the 
economic system as the size of landholdings in private hands 
increases, whether it be feudal manors, industrial towns, or mass- 
public accommodations (Spizer  and Scull 1977, Shearing and 
Stenning 1981). Private policing grows as the proportion of 
private landholdings accessible to the public grows. It has been 
suggested that the mass private property hypothesis is especially 
relevant to the North American context, where its growth has been 
most extensive. Some think that this account is less applicable to 
Britain and Western Europe where there is a greater tradition of 
public ownership of space (Jones  and Newburn 1999). At the same 
, 
time, mass private property continues to expand in tandem with new 
forms of policing in many developed countries, notably those of 
Latin American and South Asia, suggesting that the explanatory 
power of the mass private property hypothesis extends beyond the 
North American context (Caldeira  1996, Nalla 1998). 
We will not pass judgement upon the validity of this 
explanatory account pending further empirical research into the 
expa:nsion  of mass private property globally. It may be that 
Britain and Western Europe - where it has been suggested that the 
mass private property principle may not hold -  are the aberrations 
in the broader global context. 
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(3)  Economic development increases criminal 
opportunities with respect to property crime, such as theft, 
robbery, and burglary because personal property becomes more 
valuable as well as portable (Clarke  1997, Cohen and Felson 1979, 
Prenzler and Saare 1998). Furthermore, because economic 
development distributes these goods more widely in the population, 
the consciousness of risk and the need for protection bec-omd  more' 
,,,1 
generalized. 
Although we have not seen this argued as an explanation for 
restructuring, economic development is also known to raise 
expectations, which may in turn have the effect of intensifying 
dissatisfaction arising out of inequalities of wealth and 
I  opportunity. As people become less content with less, they may 
become less willing to accept the rules of what they perceive to 
be an unjust society. Thus economic development increases both the 
quantity of goods to be readily stolen and the number of potential 
property-criminals. 
D. Political character. The expansion of democracy globally 
facilitates restructuring (Cerny  1995, Drainville 1995, McMichael 
1996, Ross 1995, Slaughter 1997). Democratic governments can 
accoinmodate diverse centers of power whereas authoritarian regimes 
cannot. Democratization facilitates restructuring by providing 
political space into which it can grow. As political pluralism  a 
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increases, so too do the auspices that want to share 
responsibility for policing. 
E. Social relations. We found three hypotheses that explained 
the restructuring of policing in terms of changes in large-scale 
features of social,  organization. 
(1)  As societies become more complex, so too do the security 
needs of their people. Complexity refers to increased  3 
I 
specialization in the roles people play as well as the spatial 
dispersion of these roles  (Durkheim  1973, Elias and Boulding 1996, 
Jervis 1997). ,Social  complexity also multiplies the nuhber of 
interest-based communities, which then become potential auspices 
for constructing security on behalf of their'members.  Furthermore, 
if social complexity, especially the separation of  work from 
residence, decreases the willingness of people to exert informal 
social control, what Cohen and Felson refer to as "guardianship," 
then crime and disorder increase as well, outpacing the capacities 
of the public police  (Cohen  and Felson 1979, Jane Jacobs 1962). It 
would be natural in these circumstances for people to use the 
interest-communities they inhabit to provide security. 
(2)  Modernization of societies leads to a decline in the 
authority of primary 'social  groups such as families, residential 
communities, and occupations  (Nisbet 1969, 1975, Tonnies 1957, 
Wirth 1938). This leads to rising crime and disorder  (Caldeira 
0 
1996, Rodriguez and Winchester 1996). If governments are unable to 
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meet: public expectations about protection, people will look for 
other auspices to take responsibility. In capitalist societi,es, 
markets provide one solution by commodifying security. People who 
,  can afford to, buy what they need. In free-market societies, 
commodified security replaces what Louis Wirth called the "little 
platoons" of traditional social control (Wirth  1938)  . 
(3)  Social heterogeneity within nation-states lead  to 
I,, , 
the restructuring of policing when constituent groups, both 
economic and ascriptive, lose faith in the willingness or ability 
of government to protect them. This development is almost 
inevitable if people believe that they have been denied rights, 
among them adequate physical protection, because of their communal 
affi,liation.  The restructuring of policing on the basis of 
identity can be benign, enhancing safety where it was problematic, 
but it is inherently dangerous. Visible acts of communal self- 
protection often polarize social relations. Political compromise 
becomes increasingly difficult, the ability of government to 
perform declines, and people take policing into their own hands 
for what they feel are righteous reasons. 
In a less dramatic way, restructuring may also increase when 
demc'cratic  countries valorize minority norms and practices out of 
respect for "diversity." In order to protect cultural heritages, 
groups may claim from nation-states the ability to determine what 
is enforceable as right and wrong. On the one hand, they may 
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disagree with the majoritarian moral consensus, for example, about 
matters of dress or preventive medicine. In this case, they'want 
government policing to be looser. On the other hand, they may 
define security more narrowly than government, wanting it to 
embody communal morality, for,example,  about contact between the 
sexes. They may feel that the criminal law is too permissive. In 
this case, 
control. 
they want policing to be tighter, but under thei? 
bl , 
Whether based upon interest or identity, communities are 
simultaneously sources of social cohesion and of fragmentation, of 
discipline and of disruption. The way in which security is 
organized is both a reflection of the structure of societies and a 
I  determinant of it.  e 
F. Ideas. Ideas about government and crime have been cited as 
cont.ributors  to restructuring because circumstances alone do not 
determine the nature of policing. How people think about things 
consitrains what can be done. 
(1)  During the 1980s the idea became popular, especially 
in developed democracies, that governments were inherently less 
efficient than private auspices in providing services. In 
part,icular,  markets were accepted by many people as cost-effective 
alternative to government. As a result, public policing's loss of 
market-share was not viewed as a threat to public safety but as a 
sens,ible  response to proven inadequacy. Intellectual support for 
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influential economist Frederick Hayek argued that government 
bureaucracies, especially national ones, were less efficient than 
markets because they couldn't take advantage of local knowledge 
(Hayek  1989). Macro-social policies of earlier periods, such as 
the New Deal, were criticized as being too generic and therefore 
4, 
-3  unable to adapt to variations in circumstances across countries. 
Social problems were best solved by individuals working together 
in small arenas (Murray 1988, Osborne and Gaebler 1993). Lqcal 
knowledge was essential because governing should be done, in 
Burchell's fine phrase, "in accordance with the grain of things" 
(Burchell 1991). 
The communitarian movement also provided an idea that 
encouraged the restructuring of policing. Communitarians argued, 
as conservatives did, that government was too remote and 
impersonal to meet the needs of diverse communities (Amitai 
Etzj-oni  1983, 1993, 1996).  Their solution, however, did not 
involve economic markets. Instead, they urged government to 
formally devolve responsibilities upon neighborhoods and 
communities so that its activities could be more closely 
supervised and directed by clients and stakeholders.  Government 
would become more effective not by transcending government, but by 
allowing local communities to assume more responsibility for their  a 
own well being. 
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liberal have called for the devolution of govern,ment  services to 
new auspices - markets in the one case, local communities in the 
other. Policing is one of several functions to which these 
analyses can be applied. 
Recognizing the changed political climate, the public police 
responded with well-publicized schemes to demonstrate that t%ey 
too were responsive to local communities and giving "value for 
money.  'I  "Community partnerships" became very popular, as was 
community policing. "Accountability" and "effectiveness" became 
t, 
watc:hwords,  exemplified by performance audits in Australia, 
0 
citizens' charters in Britain, and COMSTAT in the US. 
(2)  Independently of both Hayakians and communitarians, 
criminologists and police reformers discovered during the 1970s 
and 80s that local knowledge was a neglected resource in policing. 
It was needed in order to specify and prioritize security needs 
(Trojanowicz and Bucqeroux 1990, Goldstein 1990), to diagnose 
problems  (Golstein 1990),  to implement remedies  (Bayley  1994, 
Gold,stein  19901, and to render justice in acceptable terms 
(Braithwaite 1989, 1990). Localizing policing is the basis of 
community- and problem-oriented policing as well as of restorative 
justice. They are arguably the most important, certainly the most 
coherent, reform philosophies to be developed in policing during  e 
the last half century. 
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G. Culture. Whether societies are individualistic or 
communitarian in culture may affect the way they provide policing 
(Bayley  1985). Although both sorts of cultures may restructure 
policing, the form that it takes will differ. Individualistic 
societies are more likely to restructure through commercial 
a 
markets; communitarian societies through community-based 
mobilization (Bayley 1999)  . 
(4  , 
3 
Discussion 
Reflecting on the range of explanations that have been put 
forward to explain the current restructuring of policing, it is 
apparent that there has been more conjecture than science in these 
/  offerings. Reasoning has generally been a priori, although often 
grounded in sound descriptions of trends. But the connections 
between these trends and policing have been assumed rather than 
demonstrated. 
We offer three observations of our own about the processes 
that have brought about the current reconstruction of security. 
First: We think it unlikely that a single explanation for the 
phenomenon will be found. At the same time, because restructuring 
seems to be global, there may be a small number of generic factors 
contributing to it throughout the world. We suggest three that may 
be playing a role almost everywhere:  (1)  fear of crime, (2) 
0 
marketization of economies, and  (3)  the passing of a critical 
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a threshold in the creation of commercial multinational security 
companies. The first two points have been discussed above. With 
respect to the third, we are suggesting that after the commercial 
security industry reaches a certain size it creates continuing 
demand for policing through enhancement of fear, emulation among 
consumers, and presumptive protection against liability. 
Second: the reconstruction of policing may occur as the3 
result of small changes in many different social arenas. Borrowing 
from Kuhn and Gould, the restructuring of policing may represent a 
paradigmatic s,hift  in social organization that is not konnected to 
any single factor (Kuhn  1962, Gould 1996). Small and essentially 
fortuitous changes in many places may have produced a qualitative, 
"phase" change in policing that could not have been predicted from 
changes in any one of them. In complicated processes of social 
change, the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts. 
I 
Third: We believe that multilateralization evolves along 
different paths using different institutions and displays 
different mentalities depending on the relative power of 
governments, groups, and individuals. Countries will vary in the 
trajectories they follow to restructuring. In the western 
democracies, national governments monopolized policing during the 
18th, 19th, and 20th centuries at the expense of subordinate 
groups. Policing was nationalized, increasingly constructed from  m 
the top down. In the 20th century, these same democratic 
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a  governments made policing available to individuals through the 
creation of emergency-response systems. Indeed, legitimate'self- 
,  help was limited to calling 911 or its equivalent. In this way 
democratic governments made the public police serve the interests 
of disaggregate iddividuals. Later in the century, however, 
democratic governments became concerned that the police were not 
being as effective in controlling crime as the public wanted? 
Acting on the insight that local knowledge and resources were 
essential to effective crime control, the police encouraged 
I 
residential as well as interest groups to share polici'ng 
responsibility with them. This was community policing, and it 
devolved policing authority from the governm'ent  to non- 
governmental groups. At the same time, non-governmental groups 
themselves in many countries took advantage of market 
opportunities to hire their own police. This evolutionary 
trajectory producing policing that responded to collective needs 
represented by non-governmental groups and mediated either through 
markets or voluntary organizations. 
0 
In communitarian countries, such as Japan, however, policing 
has always relied more upon non-governmental structures, such as 
fami-lies,  neighborhoods, and workplaces, to assist the government 
in maintaining social order  (Bayley  1992). At the end of the 20th 
century, therefore, they had less need to commercialize policing  e 
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0  than western countries, although non-state groups were free to use 
markets if they choose. 
In authoritarian countries, policing is controlled by 
government and its primary objective is always the protection of 
the regime. Authoritarian states try hard to maintain their 
monopoly on policing and discourage groups from acting either as 
auspices or providers of policing. They too, however, recognize 
that effective crime control requires assistance from the public. 
They obtain it through mobilizing groups, just as democratic 
governments do, but not by allowing them to participate in 
markets. They mobilize local knowledge and resources through 
coopting direction. This trajectory produces the pretence of 
multilateralization and a style of policing that is preoccupied 
with threats to governments rather than to individuals. 
Although we believe that policing is being restructured 
around the world, the extent as well as the form of it depends on 
local history and circumstances, in particular by the trajectory 
on which policing is already developing. Locality matters, even to 
generic trends such as restructuring. 
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CHAPTER VI: ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
The contemporary transformation of policing is like Topsy in 
the "Uncle Tom's  Cabin" -  without anyone paying attention, "it 
just growed"  (Stowe  1852). But Topsy is no longer a beguiling 
adolescent; she has become a giant that many find menacing  (Forst 
and Manning forthcoming; Loader 1997; Grabosky 1999; Les Johnston 
I 
I,, 
1992). Peter Manning, for example, says: 
\\ .... the essence of the economic/free market paradigm, or 
extracting fees and profit from human misery and commodified 
needs, is inconsistent with the police mandate, the nature1,of 
collective goods and their distribution, and in some senSe the 
moral bases o<  collective solidarity and trust that: as'lyet  bind 
us"  (Forst  and Manning, forthcoming, p. 228). 
Echoing our concern with a growing dual'istic division-of- 
labor between the public and private sectors, Rod Morgan observes: 
"At present there seems to be a danger that we may end up 
with the worst of all possible worlds: increasingly large and 
centralized police services with ever-growing powers, alongside 
the anarchic emergence of unregulated self-help and private  * 
'police'  or 'security' services in the hands of sectional local 
interests.  'I  (Morgan  1994) 
So, among people who have noticed that policing is being 
changed dramatically, questions are being asked about whether the 
change is good or bad. And if it is bad, what should be done about 
it? For example, should government supervise what is occurring? 
Should non-governmental police agencies be made publicly 
accountable in the way that public police agencies are? Can  a 
governments regulate non-governmental policing without stifling 
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its creativity and efficiency? Can government regulate non- 
governmental policing in the public interest when its own  ' 
,  bureaucracies have a vested interest in preserving their monopoly? 
Should governments encourage the restructuring of policing, 
especially for popblations underserved by existing security  , 
arrangements? Can it do so constructively without losing the very 
benefits that restructuring promises?  I 
3 
In short, what is the role of government in a restructuring 
of policing that is changing the governance of security?  1, 
Not surpr,isingly,  we will not try to answer t6ese"questions. 
Too little is known at this time about restructuring itself and 
still less about the effect of alternative regulatory regimes upon 
it. There are many opinions about the role of government, but they  0 
tend, with a few exceptions, to be general and philosophical 
rather than pointed and programmatic. 
What we can do, however, is explore the kinds of public 
interests that governments should be concerned about as the 
transformation continues. Although we are unsure about the balance 
that should ultimately be struck between governmental and non- 
governmental policing, especially because of the hybrid nature of 
contemporary policing, we will suggest functions that we believe 
government should retain with respect to policing. 
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The Public Interests of Policing 
There are three public interests that must continue to be 
served as the governance of security is transformed. They are  (1) 
justice,  (2)  equality, and  (3)  service. 
(1)  Justice. As with the public police, non-governmental 
providers may violate the law and behave in illegal ways. For 
example, private security personnel have denied access on th$ 
basis of race, engaged in industrial espionage, and forcibly 
broken the picket lines of striking workers.  They have harassed 
homeless people in an effort to "clean up" neighborhoods and used 
excessive force in maintaining order in bars and sports venues. 
They have violated the privacy of individuals by obtaining and 
acting on privileged information obtained from the police. And it 
is not just commercial security agents that engage in such 
practices. Community-based providers of policing have 
discriminated against residents or overreached legally  (Owens 
1997, Ross, Smith, and Pritt 1996, Smith et al. 1997). One must 
never forget that the substitution of policing by states for 
policing by communities was an important factor in the liberation 
of workers, women, and minority groups from local, often 
customary, tyrannies. 
The leverage that governments have over such behavior varies 
from country to country. Some countries protect human rights with 
laws, others do not. Some countries value human rights so highly 
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I  @  they write them into constitutions and other fundamental laws, 
creating judicially enforceable standards to which all actions of 
!  government must conform. This is true, for example, in the United 
States where non-governmental police are viewed as private persons 
under contract to lperform a particular service. As such, they may 
(4 
be held accountable for wrongful acts under criminal, civil, and 
contract law. They enjoy none of the immunities allowed the  hubli? 
police  (Sklansky 1999). 
2. Equality of protection. No service of government is more 
fundamental th,an  protecting people's bodies and posses3ions. 
Indeed, the relationship between personal security and government 
is t.autologica1:  if people aren't provided w5th protection at some 
minimal level, government is not considered to exist. Anarchy is 
the absence of enforced public safety. Public safety in 
demclcracies is considered a public good -  an obligation of 
government to all. 
Restructuring policing through markets distorts the 
distribution of security in favor of those who can afford it; 
restructuring policing through voluntary mobilization distorts it 
in favor of those who are creative and committed enough to 
organize it in-kind. The former runs the risk of creating a 
dualistic system of policing where the poor are protected by the 
public police operating with a deterrent, law-enforcement 
0 
mentality and the rich are protected by private police using a 
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Shearing 1996; Braithwaite 1998). 
,  According to Sam Walker, this is not a new problem for the 
I 
United States -  the rich have always been protected better and 
less punitively than the poor have (Walker  1975).  In the last 
couple of decades, various levels of American government have 
sponsored voluntary neighborhood policilng precisely so as to3make, 
policing more effective and more acceptable to insecure inner city 
populations. As Patrick V. Murphy, former Commissioner of Pcolice 
I 
of N'ew York Ci,ty,  has observed, "Community policing'  is  "private 
policing for the poor"  (Private  communication). 
If the distribution of policing coincides with structural 
divisions of race and class, the legitimacy of government itself 
may be jeopardized. People may be encouraged not only to take the 
law into their hands for their private protection, but also to 
defy law associated with unresponsive government. Societies that 
fail to pay attention to the distribution of security are playing 
with dynamite blindfolded. 
With the growth of market-based policing there is always the 
danger that affluent people will become less willing to support 
public policing on the argument that they are paying twice for the 
same service. Robert Reich refers to this as the "secession of the 
~uccessfu1,"  which is already occurring in the field of public  e 
education  (Herrnstein  and Murray 1996, p. 517). 
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Assuming that multilateralization skews the distribution of 
security, what can be done about it and by whom? Even in countries 
where safety is regarded as a fundamental right, it may not be 
enforceable in law. In the United States, for example, the courts 
have determined that minimal levels of security are not guaranteed 
under the Constitution  (Sklansky 1999). Nor is government liable 
for civil damages if it neglects to provide adequate protect.on, 
except in a few limited circumstances (Sklansky  1999).  2 
The danger arising out of an unequal distribution of public 
security has been considered so serious and so immanent that one 
British Chief Constable has proposed that all police providers 
should be made "police compliant," meaning that their services 
should be supervised and coordinated by the public police  (Ian 
Blair 1998). Policing should remain a public good whose 
distribution cannot be distorted by commodification. The public 
police, he argues, "should put itself forward, first, as the 
central point for inter-agency cooperation designed to strengthen 
communities and, secondly, as the center point of a coordinated 
system of patrol services, carried out by a mixture of police, 
volunteer, local authority and private sources" (1998).  In other 
words, government may share policing, but it should not share the 
responsibility for it. 
a  The courts have denied tort liability on three grounds: (1)  they don't have the ability to make judgements about the 
adequacy of protection; (2) the law provides no justiciable standards; and (3) adequate redress exists through the 
political system (Sklansky 1999). 
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The rationale of devolving the practice of policing to 
mu1t:iple  auspices and providers while maintaining ultimate 
responsibility for the equitable distribution of its benefits - 
safety and security - underlies the recent proposals for the 
renewal of policing in Northern Ireland (ICPNI 1999). 
Specifically, the proposals call for the creation of a Police 
Board that is responsible for regulating the activity of allathe 
agencies involved in the multilateral process of governing 
security, and not simply the activities of the public police. 
A question of national sovereignty also arises in connection 
with the restructuring of policing. Because commercial security is 
sometimes provided by multinational corporations, the distribution 
t  of security within countries is being shaped partially by 
decisions made abroad  (Shearing and Stenning 1981). In some 
countries it can fairly be argued that foreigners working for 
large multinational corporations are better protected than locals. 
It is one thing for government to cede policing control to 
domestic non-governmental auspices, quite another to cede it to 
offsrhore interests. 
3. Quality of service. Non-government police agencies may 
fail to provide the service promised. With commercial providers, 
competition in the market place is supposed to be the corrective. 
But this doesn't always happen. Caveat emptor is an empty  a 
admonition if information is not available to consumers about the 
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neiqhborhood-based security programs, too, may not work as 
I  expected, serving instead the interests of a self-perpetuating few 
(Crawford  1995). 
Non-governmen\t  police, like public ones, also engage in 
I, 
quezjtionable, even reckless, practices. For example, a private 
security firm in Australia offered a sophisticated course in3  I 
installing burglar alarms that was taken by known armed-robbers 
wanting to learn how to bypass electronic systems (Anonymous 
1998.). Private police have endangered the public in shoot-outs 
with.  would-be kidnappers and hijackers. They have been widely 
0 
criticized for inadequately training personnkl. Supervision may 
also be lax. Some American companies have hired illegal aliens; 
others have failed to discipline employees who drink on duty  (New 
York Times 1995). Finally, security companies may misrepresent 
their services, delivering much less than promised. 
The point to this enumeration of public interests that endure 
in the new policing -  justice, equity, and quality -,is  that 
multilateralization not only effects the governance of security, 
it impacts the security of governance. Unless these interests are 
protected, the legitimacy of government itself may be affected. 
Security is both a subject of governance and a requisite for it. 
The public interest in policing endures despite restructuring. The 
important question is how it can be safeguarded.  0 
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Discussion 
From our survey of writing about accountabi,lity,  we coriclude 
that the public interest in policing can be protected if 
government retains three functions -  regulating, auditjng, and 
facilitating. 
Regulation comes in many forms. It involves more than 
enacting rules and punishing people for failing to abide byihem. 
I,,  , 
John Braithwaite and his colleagues have given a nuanced 
discussion of regulatory modalities  (Ayers  and Braithwaite 1992, 
Braithwaite and Grabosky 1986). Regulation may be done, for 
example, through command regulation with nondiscretionary 
punishment, command regulation with discretionary punishment, 
I  enforced self-regulation, and voluntary self-regulation (Ayres  and 
Braithwaite 1992). One-size does not fit all regulatory problems, 
and both regulatory efficacy and regulatory costs vary with the 
choices made. 
If the public interests of justice, equity, and service are 
to be safeguarded, governments must audit what security agencies 
provide. They must monitor what is going on in a systematic way. 
Government must use this information to evaluate the distribution 
of security provided by various combinations of providers. This 
requires the development of a capacity that governments currently 
I 
do not have, namely, the capacity to evaluate the relative quality 
of police protection throughout its territory and across social 
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a  classes and divisions. The intellectual as well as the 
administrative problems in doing this are daunting and requi,re  the 
collaborative effort of social scientists, lawyers, and 
specialists in public administration. 
Providing equitable security imposes an additional and very 
difficult obligation upon governments. They must learn to mix and 
match policing services, which means they must learn how to 
facilitate the growth of different kinds of policing. As Peter 
/I,  , 
Grabosky has said: 
"Whether it is the public or private sector which carries law 
enforcement has become a misplaced question. One must now inquire 
what institutional form, or what blend of institutional forms, is 
best suited to a given task. The design and guidance of hybrid law 
enforcement systems is an essential task of government in the next  0  century'' (1996). 
Governments have many instruments for mixing and matching 
forms of policing: subsidies, entitlements and incentives (such  as 
tax-rebates), mandated coordination, cooperative support, 
contracting out, delegation, and abdication of responsibility 
(Grabosky  1996; Bayley 1999; Prenzler and Saare 1998). We need to 
know more about the costs and benefits of these mechanisms. 
Governments seem generous and responsive, for instance, when they 
talk about forming "partnerships" with non-state'  police auspices 
and providers, but their assistance may be more stultifying than 
encouraging. "Partnerships" can be a clever way of staying in 
charge (Johnston  1999, Crawford 1998, Cruikshank 1999, Lacey and  0 
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0  Zedner 1998, Fu 1993, Hou and Sheu 1994, Aydin on Turkey). In 
order for governments to become effective at diversifying policing 
appropriately, police policy-makers need to study the record of 
government facilitation in other arenas, such as education, 
irrigation, communications, and electrical power  (Ostrom  1990). 
Conclusion 
Given the fragmentary nature of ou'r  current knowledge a5out  , 
the restructuring of policing, we cannot approve or disapprove of 
it in principle. Its advantages and disadvantages depend on,  social 
conditions, combinations of auspices and providers, th&'  nature of 
criminal threats, and the feasibility of alternatives. We 
disclount,  therefore, the apocalyptic visions of restructuring, 
although we acknowledge the dangers to freedom in any form of 
policing. Vigilance will be the price of liberty, as Thomas 
Jefferson said, in the future as in the past. For this reason we 
also discount the view that restructuring will generate new forms 
of accountability on its own. It may, but governments as we know 
them are the only institution that have the authority and capacity 
to make this determination and take corrective action as required. 
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CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH AGENDA 
The transformation of policing that is oc,curring  currently 
has not yet attracted the sustained scholarly attention it 
deserves. Although researchers have nibbled around the edges of 
the topic, the extent, nature, and impact of police restructuring 
have yet to be determined. Based upon our survey of existing 
writing and our understanding of what is happening, we have  3 
constructed the following research agenda. These are the questions 
we think most urgently require study. The questions are grouped 
into four categories: 
(1)  Foundational description. What is happening to policing? 
(2)  Social impact. What effect is restructuring having on 
I  safety, justice, and equity? 
(3)  Government policy. What is government doing and with what 
effect? 
(4)  Causation. What factors are shaping the reconstruction of 
policing and government's relation to it? 
Foundational Description 
(1)  Who is constructing and delivering policing in the modern 
world? Answering this requires more than counting public and 
private cops. It requires determining who people hold responsible 
for public safety, what we have called the auspices of policing. 
Beca.use  security regimes vary across time and space, the research 
needs to be conducted comparatively, which will require 
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researchers to employ a common format for describing what is 
happening. 
Two approaches might be taken to answering this question. 
First: people in different places could be asked whom they expect 
to provide protection. Who are the first-line providers of 
policing locally and who is responsible for them? Second: maps 
could be constructed showing the amount of time a cross-sect4on of 
I 
people inhabit in the course of a normal day/week/month and what 
the security auspices and provides are in each. 
(2)  How many non-governmental providers of policing, both 
voluntary and commercial, are there, what do they do, how much do 
they cost, and whom do they serve?  e 
(3)  How have the public police adapted to restructuring? Is 
the nature and scope of public policing changing? Are its 
functions increasing or decreasing? Are public police defining 
their responsibilities differently than in the past? Have they 
changed their geographical deployment as a result of the growth of 
private security? 
(4)  How do governmental and non-governmental policing agents 
interact in the field? In other words, what is the interface 
between auspices of both kinds and providers of both kinds? Do 
they ignore, hinder, or help one another? Do they plan together, 
coordinate operations, exchange information? 
c, 
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is, being made available to private interests for money? 
(6)  Do different providers of policing take different 
operational approaches when performing the same task? In our 
terminology, do mentalities differ among providers of security? An 
important source of information would be public police officers 
who have gone to work for commercial security companies. The? 
would be asked what they find different in operations and 
management between public and private police agencies. 
(7)  With respect to the commercial security industry, several 
questions need answering: 
(a)  How many companies are there? How many people do 
,  they employ? Who do they work for? How much does this form of  a 
policing cost? 
(b)  What is the degree of industrial concentration in 
the private security industry? 
(c)  Do the activities of multinational security 
companies vary from country to country? How much central direction 
do multinational companies exert over the operations of local 
p  r  ov  :i  de  r  s  ? 
Social Impact 
(1)  How effective are the different auspices/providers of 
security? Especially, has restructuring produced greater or less 
pub1i.c safety, and for whom? This could be studied cross-  @ 
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46 
sectionally, comparing places with different mixes of policing, or 
longitudinally, examining changes in criminality and disorder 
I  before and after a major shift in the nature of policing in a 
particular place. In both cases, great care must be taken in 
describing the nabure of the policing mixes. 
4 
In this connection, it's curious that no one, to our 
knowledge, has suggested that the recent much-publicized dedine  , 
in crime in the U.S. might be due to the growth of non-state 
polrLcing, especially in its commercial form. Criminologists have 
attributed the decrease to changes in demographics; cr'?me 
patterns, gun-crime, and police numbers and tactics. We can think 
of four reasons why the restructuring of policing may have played 
a role. 
First: multilateralization may have produced a more visible 
"police" presence. Cumulatively, the visibility of police has 
grown dramatically over the past decade. 
Second: crime may be reported less to the public police and 
more to the private, reducing its chances of becoming an official 
statistic. 
Third: more people may be living, working, buying, and 
playing in environments regulated by non-governmental police, 
hence the opportunities for crime have decreased. 
Fourth: formerly disadvantaged social groups, among whom 
crime is likely to be high, are perhaps being more intensively 
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policed either by voluntary associations or by public police 
redeployed away from areas covered by commercial security. 
(2)  Who gains and loses in terms of public safety as a result 
of the reconstruction of policing? In other words, has the 
distribution of security changed as the result of restructuring? 
For example, Ian Loader has suggested that multilateralization 
wiill  displace crime from private to public spaces (1997).  TMs 
critical question will be difficult to answer because it will 
require the construction of a test for the quantity of security. 
Public opinion surveys as well as official measures of crime and 
disorder could be used. 
(3)  Does restructuring cause a decline in support for public 
I  policing among privileged groups, Reich's "secession of the 
successful"  (Murray  1988)?  Are people who are covered by 
commercial police protection less likely to support public 
expenditures for policing? 
(4)  Are the rights of individuals more or less at risk when 
policing is provided by non-state rather than state 
auspices/providers? Do violations of rights vary according to the 
nature of  the policing? Generally, do the forms of misbehavior 
vary with the type of policing? 
(5)  Are non-state providers of policing more or less 
accountable than the state police? This question has two 
dimensions. First: how effective is the oversight of the group 
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which has instigated the non-governmental policing? For example, 
do they pay close or only episodic attention? Are there well- 
understood ways of bringing problems to their attention? Second: 
whose interests are'  represented in the operations of the new 
4 
pol.ice? For exampl,e,  are some people being policed without 
representation in the accountable body? 
, 
(6)  To what extent do community-based justice systems,  auch 
I 
as mediation and restorative-justice conferences, enhance security 
through the undertakings they develop among participants?  , 
Government Policy  ,,  ,I 
(1)  What are the variations in legal conditions within which 
restructuring is occurring from country'  to country? What is 
legally allowed and not allowed? 
(2)  What aspects of non-state policing are being regulated by 
governments and in what ways? What aspects do governments think 
require more regulatory attention? 
(3)  In what ways are non-governmental providers of security 
held accountable for violations of law, human rights, and 
contract? 
(4)  What is the relative effectiveness of different 
mechanisms in achieving accountability? In Australia, for example, 
Prenzler and Saare say "TO date, there have been no controlled 
studies of expanded legislation to test the impact of new 
requirements..  .  ."(1998).  a 
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(5)  How have the public police responded comparatively across 
countries to the growth of non-state policing? It seems tosus that 
4 
some have been indifferent, others hostile, a few cooperative, and 
some coopting. 
, 
(6)  What regulations do governments have for managing the 
I 
I,, 
relationship between public and private police, for example, with 
respect to sharing information, using facilities, reporting ?!rime,, 
making arrests,,  submitting cases for prosecution, and employing 
personnel  ? 
Causation 
(1)  What factors account for the growth of non-state 
policing? In addition to the customary appro'ach of correlating  0 
changes in policing with other measurable social factors, it might 
be ~iseful  to ask people what motivated them to create alternative 
auspices of policing or to seek other suppliers of policing? 
Historical research would also be important in determining 
the evolutionary paths followed by different countries with 
respect to the auspices and providers of policing. Chronological 
comparison of the changes in policing among countries will reveal 
likely determinants. 
(2)  What governmental regulations facilitate or retard the 
development of non-state policing? 
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(3)  What factors explain differences in the sorts of 
regulations and legal environments countries have developed with 
respect to non-state policing? 
(4)  If operational mentalities differ among police, as we 
belive, what accounts for them? There are several possibilities: 
the nature of the tasks they are assigned, the conditions in which 
they work, the directions given by sponsoring auspices, and their 
in-house professional experience. 
(5)  Can governments manipulate the conditions required for 
the successful development of  (a)  security markets  (commodified 
security) and  (b)  cooperative security auspices  (community-based 
security)? What should government do and not do? To this end, it 
would be useful to study government's experience with 
restructuring in other dimensions of social policy as well, such 
as housing, irrigation, and education. 
Conclusion 
It may not be easy to marshal the kind of sustained 
intellectual attention that current developments in policing 
deserve and that our agenda calls for. There are three reasons for 
this. 
First: criminal justice education and scholarship focuses 
almost exclusively on institutions of government. Governments are 
its main supporters, practitioners its primary clientele, and  a  - 
state agencies the main employers of its students. Perhaps this 
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was inevitable in a field that grew out of the perception that 
research about the activity and effectiveness of the institutions 
of crime control was being neglected by traditional criminology. 
Criminal justice education and research thereby tied itself to the 
chariot wheel of the state and it remains so today. 
I 
, 
4,  I 
Second: criminal justice scholarship is more concerned with 
institutional effectiveness than with institutional evolutid. 
I 
This, too, reflects its concern with public, meaning government, 
policy. For criminal-justice social scientists, institutioqal 
variation is s,tudied  in order to determine the relative 
effectiveness of different policies, but not, except for a handful 
of researchers, to account for the variety itself. American 
historians have done better than social scientists in this regard, 
and for a simple reason. Because they are concerned with changes 
over time, their research does not take institutional forms as 
givens. 
Third: American criminal justice scholarship is parochial and 
not internationally comparative. In part this reflects its 
preoccupation with efficacy. Americans generally assume that 
polilcies  that work in one country will not work in another due to 
differences in social setting, culture, and history. They believe 
that social processes in the United States are unique. This deeply 
rooted belief overlooks the fact that the only way it can be 
tested is through comparative research. As a result, because 
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American criminal justice scholars focus so exclusively on the 
4 
United States, they fail to see that institutions are artisacts, 
I  created out of combinations of contemporary exigencies and 
\ 
historical traditions. Context for them is a given, much as water 




For all these reasons, American criminal ju'stice scholarship 
is not prepared to perceive the significance of  what is occufring, 
in contemporary policing. It is doubtful that it will able to 
provide the sort of intellectual support needed to guide public 
policy.  48  I4 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
Policing is changing today as profoundly as when Sir Robert 
Peel put the first Bobby on the streets of London in 1829. The new 
model that is being constructed consists of two elements. First: 
the people who authorize policing have become separate from the 
people who do it. Second: the new players in policing are not part 
of formal government. As a result, governments, especially 
3 
governments of nation-states, have lost their monopoly on 
policing. The change that is occurring is paradigmatic because it 
cannot be understood in customary terms  (Kuhn 1962). The current 
restructuring involves more than "privatization." It involves a 
blurring of  the boundary between the public and private. The new  a 
paradigm also involves more than decentralization or devolution 
because these terms apply to changes within a single institutional 
system. What is taking place in policing today crosses 
institutional boundaries. Because of the unprecedented nature of 
today's  reconstruction, we have coined the term 
"multilateralization" to describe the nature of the restructuring. 
What is happening to policing today is also paradigmatic 
because it is more than an elaboration on what has gone before. It 
is a fundamental transformation in the way security is governed. 
In the new paradigm the very concept of government, 
technically the state, becomes problematic. How will we recognize  a 
government if policing is no longer done exclusively by the public 
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police? How should we refer to people who have been authorized 
expressly to police but aren't employed by government? When people 
I  deliberately and legitimately construct policing, either through 
\ 
authorizing it, aren't  they engaged in governance? 
Of course, what we have just said about the importance of 
I 
what: is happening depends on current trends being general and 
stable. Only time will tell whether we ,have  over- or under- 
I 
estimated their significance. For this reason it is critically 
, 
important to study the structure of policing now in order t,o 
establish benchmarks by which to judge the extent o'f  cHange in the 
future. Contemporary changes in policing should also be studied 
because policing affects human well-being so'fundamentally. 
Failure to provide public safety fairly and equitably can affect 
the stability of government itself. Finally, insights into the 
changing governance of security have implications for foreign 
policy. A country like the United States that is concerned about 
the expansion of democracy abroad must pay careful attention to 
policing. The governance of security is both an indicator of the 
quality of political life and a major determinant of it. 
The restructuring of policing that we have described refers 
to a process of transferring the construction of security to non- 
governmental groups within existing states. But there is another 
process going on, one which constitutes an equally profound  a 
challenge to nation-states. At the very moment that policing is 
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being distributed to new groups within states, it is also being 
developed vigorously at international levels as well. Nation- 
,  states are ceding their authority to police both upward and 
downward. This "globalization" of policing has several dimensions 
that are not always distinguished. 
I 
First: private multinational corporations now provide 
pol.icing  on a worldwide basis  (Johnston 1999, Patterson 1995':  and, 
Zarate 1998). In our terminology, they are providers of 
transnational policing. 
Second: transnational cooperation among law-eri'for'cement 
agencies of  nation-states is developing,rapidly  (Nadelman 1993, 
Fijnaut 1987, and Murphy 1998). National law'-enforcement  agencies  e 
cultivate relations with colleagues abroad, undertake joint 
operations, exchange information, and share facilities. Pooling 
colltective resources in an ad hoc way to meet a common threat, 
they are similar to the posse in the old American west. INTERPOL 
was the earliest transnational institution created by this sort of 
transnational collaboration. Such actions encourage the 
presumption, undoubtedly correct, that effective policing at the 
turn of the millennium requires governance at transnational 
levels. 
Third: policing is being undertaken by genuinely 
international institutions, such as the United Nations, the World  m 
Court, and the European Union. Functionally specific agencies, 
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too, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
increasingly require countries either to develop or reform 
policing in specific ways as conditions for receiving assistance. 
The impulse to create supranational auspices for policing is the 
same as that which created existing nation-states out of 
previously sovereign principalities, estates, kingdoms, cities, 
and small countries. The common precipitator in both cases i3 the 
need to construct security at more encompassing levels  (Bayley 
1975, 1985).  Note that the organization of policing at 
international levels of government, like restructuring within 
nation-states, will cause conceptual confusion. Are armed forces 
acting under international direction "police" or "military"? What 
Americans call the Korean War was technically a "police action" 
carried out by the United Nations. 
Policing today is being restructured away from nation-states 
by two forces: multilateralization within countries and supra- 
nationalization among countries. In both cases, policing is no 
longer being constructed and provided exclusively by nation- 
states. It is quite unclear how these forces will play out in the 
next few years. The possibilities are worthy of a millenium. 
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